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A Hybrid Model for Learning from Failures: the Hurricane Katrina Disaster 
 
Abstract: 
There is a need to facilitate learning from failures in the context of natural and man-
made disasters. This paper investigates the multi-faceted nature of research in disasters 
and the aspect of hybrid approaches in modelling within this domain. The paper applies 
a framework of reliability and multiple criteria decision analysis techniques to the case 
of the Hurricane Katrina disaster of 2005.  It is shown how this hybrid model can be 
used through an integrative approach to perform a systematic analysis that can lead to 
learning from failures.  
The proposed framework incorporates and integrates Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), 
Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) analysis and the Risk Priority Number (RPN) 
concept, together with the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) which is used as a 
simulation model for decision support.  It is shown how the proposed integrated 
framework can contribute to our understanding of failures and enhances the ability to 
extract lessons from failures or disasters. Such lessons are then mapped into specific 
decisions for prevention, and resource allocations, to help avoid a repeat disaster. 
 
 
Keywords: Decision Making, Natural Disasters, Failure Mode Effect and Criticality 
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1. INTRODUCTION1 
Previous research has shown that organizations learn more effectively from failures than from 
successes (Madsen, and Desai 2010) and that failures contain valuable information, but 
organizations vary in their ability to learn from them (Desai, 2010).  It has also been argued 
that there is a need for a paradigm shift in accidents models due to new challenges that relate 
to issues such as the fast pace of technological change, the changing nature of accidents, 
decreasing tolerance to single accidents and increasing complexity and coupling (Leveson, 
2004). Pavlou and El Sawy (2011) investigated means of measuring dynamic capabilities and 
concluded that among its properties are learning, sensing the environment, coordinating and 
integrating. Also, learning can be enhanced through developing simulations and mental 
models (Clark, and Kent, 2013). 
 
Research in to disasters and learning from them is multi-faceted in nature (Kulatunga, 
2010). Labib and Read (2013) investigated the issue of learning from failures and applied 
reliability analysis techniques of Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Reliability Block Diagrams 
(RBD) as a framework model for learning from failures. This was based on the analysis of 
four case studies related to reported disasters, which included the Titanic disaster, the BP 
Texas City incident, the Chernobyl disaster, and NASA’s Space Shuttle Columbia accident. 
Reliability engineering techniques such as FTA, RBD and Failure Mode, Effects and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA) have been used to analyze the case of the Bhopal disaster 
(Labib and Champaneri, 2012), and it has been shown how such techniques can help in 
building a mental model of describing the causal effects of the disaster. The same case study 
of Bhopal was also investigated (Ishizaka and Labib, 2013) and a new logic gate in a fault 
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 This research builds on and extends previous work in chapter 10 of Labib (2014) 
tree was proposed for analyzing disasters and the benefits of using hybrid techniques of 
multiple criteria and fault analysis to evaluate and prevent disasters were demonstrated. 
Hybrid modelling has recently been adopted by several authors. For example, Kou et al 
(2014) provided an efficient hybrid model that integrates fuzzy logic, survey 
questionnaires, Delphi and multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) methods for 
disaster assessment. Li et al (2014a) provided a community-based virtual database for 
emergency management. Also Li et al (2014b) developed a mult-objective optimisation 
model for oil-importing decisions in extreme events. Zolfani et al (2013) proposed a 
hybrid MCDM method for the selection of a tunnel ventilation system in the event of 
automobile accidents. Vaidogas and Šakėnaitė (2010) proposed a hybrid model for fire 
risk in the form of quantitative risk assessment and multi-attribute selection. Poplawska 
et al (2014) proposed a hybrid multi criteria decision analysis framework for 
implementation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) in the extractive sector. 
  
Tinsley et al, (2012), who investigated near-miss events as well as Hurricane Katrina and 
other disasters, concluded that “people may be complacent because prior experience with a 
hazard can subconsciously bias their mental representation of the hazard in a way that often 
(but not always) promotes unrealistic reassurance”. This paper extends this work on 
Hurricane Katrina disaster, by providing and integrating tools that can help in performing a 
systematic analysis that can lead to learning from failures. It is hoped that this hybrid 
modelling approach will contribute to the provision of a useful mental representation of 
disasters.  
In this paper, a number of reliability analysis techniques are employed.  FTA is used to 
identify the main direct causes and contributing factors (failure modes) of the Hurricane 
Katrina disaster, and to show how these direct causes and contributing factors interacted with 
each other.  The interactions identified through FTA are used as an input to an RBD analysis, 
to demonstrate how overall system reliability could be calculated and improved through, for 
example, strengthening weak (series) structures revealed by the analysis. The failure modes 
identified through the FTA analysis are used as input for an FMECA analysis for the 
identification of a Risk Priority Number (RPN) of each failure mode which can be used to 
rank the risk of different failure modes. 
Leveson (2004) argued that event based accident models, such as FTA, RBD and FMECA, 
have limitations due to their emphasis on linear causality and inability to deal with non-linear 
relationships such as feedback, and may give only a superficial explanation about why a 
disaster may have occurred. In order to overcome this limitation and contribute to the 
provision of a deeper understanding of the reasons for failure as well as support for decision 
making, this present paper employs Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) techniques to 
structure and analyse the information provided by the reliability techniques. The work 
presented here utilises the MCDM technique of Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to provide 
prioritisation, sensitivity analysis and feedback on consistency of the different criteria and the 
alternative contributing factors. The model helps the decision maker to prioritise different 
strategies and the allocation of resources. It also provides a sensitivity analysis and a measure 
of consistency as a form of feedback. Also in this paper we discuss the high level design 
improvements, and the lessons learned which should be acted upon so as to avoid a repeat 
disaster. 
Figure 1 outlines a flowchart of the structure and relationship between the different 
techniques used. The three techniques of FMECA, FTA, and RBD belong to the reliability 
analysis domain, whereas AHP is an MCDM technique. 
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Figure (1): The model structure and the relationships between the different techniques 
 
The contributions of the study are both theoretical and methodological. On the theoretical 
side, it is shown how data - some of which is based on interpretation and judgement and some 
is more empirical in nature - can be combined in a rich framework that can be used by 
decision makers to prioritise different strategies and allocation of resources. Although the 
chosen methods are all normative decision making or assessment techniques, and not 
inference techniques, by combining them one can illicit useful recommendations for policy 
making. On the methodological side, it is shown how the two fields of risk analysis and 
decision science can be combined and utilised in an integrated manner. It also shows that 
techniques intended for prospective decision making can be utilised to retrospective events. 
Finally, our use of hybrid modelling makes a contribution towards demonstration of 
both the ‘interactive and integrative’ capabilities of the chosen models.  
According to Cacciabue and Vella (2010) retrospective analysis aims at understanding and 
extracting lessons from past events through techniques related to data mining and root cause 
analysis, whereas prospective analysis looks ahead and speculates safety levels of systems 
through brainstorming initiating events and generation of counter safety measures. They also 
argue that to ensure consistency and consolidation of the whole safety approach, there is a 
need to utilise same reference models. Hence, in this paper, the same data, methods and 
techniques are used for retrospective and prospective analysis. 
It may be argued that single techniques have limited capacities to represent complex realities, 
but simply adding more techniques does not necessarily improve learning. It may make 
inferences harder to make, and it may introduce contradictions. We demonstrate through the 
narrative of the case study that the proposed hybrid integrated approach provides better 
understanding of the causal factors as well as provision of decision support for resource 
allocation and prevention of similar devastating consequences from disastrous events. 
 
 
2. ANALYSING DIASASTERS 
A disaster may be considered as a Black Swan, a term coined by Taleb (2010) to describe an 
event which has the three attributes of rarity, extreme impact and retrospective predictability. 
Taleb (2010) argues that this phenomenon is accelerating as the world is getting more 
complicated. Globally, natural hazards are increasing at an increasing rate. According to 
Rougier et al (2010), such increase is due to factors such as environmental change, population 
growth, new forms of exposure and social vulnerability. The authors of this work believe that 
the combination of low predictability and large impact makes disasters a great challenge to 
analyse and hence this paper is both timely and of utility. We accept that hurricanes happen 
as a rate of 1/100 per year so they are not that rare, but the Katrina disaster is not just an 
ordinary hurricane in terms of its impact compared to the history of all past hurricanes, which 
makes it a unique event. 
 
There are two categories of lessons that can be learnt from the Katrina event which are 
similar to those proposed by Flouron (2011) when describing the BP Deepwater Horizon 
accident. The first relates to narrow, or specific, lessons while the second relates to broader 
issues. The former category arises when describing such an event as a ‘failure due to human 
negligence, or having insufficiently high, strong and maintained levees in a hurricane prone 
area’, a type of technical failure, whereas  the latter arises from describing such an event as a 
‘disaster’, defined as an occurrence inflicting widespread destruction and distress. Through 
the latter lens the event is considered broadly in a social science, political, systems theory and 
management approach, as suggested by the seminal work of Turner (1978) which was then 
followed up by Toft and Reynolds (1997).   
The analysis of disasters can produce four main benefits: First, it can help to identify the root 
cause of what went wrong and why.  Second, it can act as an early warning signal just prior to 
the event in order to take pre-emptive measures. Third, it can help to institute long term plans 
to prevent similar events from re-occurring. Fourth, it can provide decision makers with a set 
of priorities for resource allocation for both recovery and prevention. 
 
Here the term ‘root cause’ needs to be treated with care. In an accident investigation, if root 
cause is perceived as for example, ‘someone’s behaviour’ then it may be likely, as argued by 
Rasmussen (1997), that the accident would occur by another cause at another time. The 
authors of this work agree that in this example, such root cause is superficial and should be 
regarded as still part of the symptom rather than the real root cause. A real root cause needs 
to be plan and policy related with respect to the current status quo. As such, ideally a root 
cause should lead to initiation or modification of standard operating procedures (SOPs). Also 
a root cause needs to contribute to the three features of how learning from failures is defined 
as outlined by Labib and Read (2013), where they argue that learning from failures consists 
of feedback to design of existing procedures, use of advanced techniques to analyse failures, 
and generation of interdisciplinary generic lessons. 
 
The innovative aspect of the study presented here is the integration of modelling approaches 
in a generic hybrid model, since single techniques have limited capacities to represent 
complex realities. The majority of modelling applications tend to use a single model to 
analyse a problem, but the issue with this line of approach is that any methodology that relies 
on just one stand-alone, model has its limitations due to the inherent assumptions that exist in 
any one particular model and, accordingly, it becomes inadequate in providing an effective 
and realistic approach. Subsequently, such an approach leads itself into trying to manipulate 
the problem in hand in order to “fit it” into the method instead of vice versa. So, relying on 
just one model for analysis may distract people who are carrying out the accident 
investigation, as they attempt to fit the accident into the model, which, as argued by Kletz 
(2001) may limit free thinking.  
Therefore, what is proposed here is to develop a hybrid model approach which offers richness 
to the analysis. Moreover, it combines the strengths of the models used, and the limitations 
that exist in each model tend to cancel each other; in other words, they complement each 
other. The proposed hybrid models are fully integrated to provide an effective and efficient 
approach, firstly for identifying and prioritising important features that led to the disaster and 
need improvement, and secondly for optimising the allocation of resources to prevent or 
mitigate the consequences of future disasters. 
 
3. THE HURRICANE KATRINA DISASTER 
The Hurricane Katrina disaster has been studied in detail by the American Society of Civil 
Engineers - ASCE (2007), Select Bipartisan Committee (2007) – a Committee of the US 
Senate, Jonkman et al (2009), Crowther et al (2007), Griffis (2007) and van Reeet al (2011). 
Although it could be argued that this section could be made much shorter by simply referring 
the reader to the abundant information in the above reports it is suggested that such a primary 
data collection would be of lower quality as over time memories would have faded and key 
individuals may no longer be available. Therefore, a secondary data analysis (which is a 
proven and widely used research method) will be used for the problem structuring. Such a 
secondary analysis also gives the possibility of triangulating sources. Moreover, the 
information can be easily checked by other researchers. 
 
New Orleans is situated near where the Mississippi River flows into the Gulf of Mexico in 
south eastern Louisiana. It was built on low-lying marshland between the Mississippi River, 
Lake Pontchartrain, Lake Borgne and the Gulf of Mexico. The New Orleans region and its 
busy port, which is one of the most important ones in the United States, are part of 
Louisiana’s extensive petroleum infrastructure which supplies oil and other petroleum 
products to the rest of the country. The state of Louisiana itself is ranked fifth in United 
States oil production, is home to a network of pipelines, storage facilities, seventeen 
petroleum refineries and two of the US’s four Strategic Petroleum Reserves. Also New 
Orleans serves as a business centre for BP, Shell Oil, Chevron and ConocoPhillips. 
 
Sinking Region 
New Orleans is built on a foundation of thousands of feet of soft sand, silt and clay. 
Subsidence (settling) of the ground surface occurs naturally due to consolidation, oxidation 
and groundwater pumping influences. Large portions of Orleans, St. Bernard and Jefferson 
parishes (counties) are therefore below sea level and continue to sink. 
 
Prior to 1946, flooding and subsequent sediment deposition counterbalanced natural 
subsidence leaving south eastern Louisiana at or above sea level. However, due to major 
flood control structures being put in place, fresh layers of sediment are not being deposited so 
as to replenish ground lost to flooding. Also groundwater withdrawal, petroleum production, 
development and other factors are all contributing to the subsidence which is estimated by the 
US Geological Survey to occur at a rate of between 0.15 and 0.2 inches per year with rates of 
up to 1 inch per year occurring in some places. 
 
Hurricane Protection System 
Responsibility for design and construction of most of the flood and hurricane protection 
levees along the Mississippi River and in the New Orleans region rests with USACE (United 
States Army Corps of Engineers). Their strategy was to build levees or floodwalls around 
segments of New Orleans. Typical USACE flood protection structures constructed in and 
around New Orleans were: i) Earthen levees, ii) I-Walls (used to raise the level of flood 
protection), and iii) T-Walls (shaped like an upside-down T with substantial armoured 
foundations). 
 
Other agencies own and operate further flood protection systems such as the interior drainage 
and pumping stations, the Mississippi River Levee Flood Protection System, and non-
USACE levee features. 
 
Hurricane Katrina 
Hurricanes are not a new phenomenon to south east Louisiana; there have been 13 major 
hurricanes in the last 155 years.  Hurricane Katrina started out in the Bahamas as a tropical 
storm on 23rd August 2005. It crossed south Florida on 25th August as a Category 1 
hurricane before entering the Gulf of Mexico. The hurricane intensified as it tracked 
westward. 
 
Hurricanes are categorised based on their maximum wind speed according to the Saffir-
Simpson Hurricane Scale.  On 28
th
 August, the hurricane began tracking toward the 
northwest, and intensified from a Category 2 (96-110mph) to a Category 5 (>155mph) in just 
12 hours. As it approached land, the warm, moist air and energy that it could draw from the 
Gulf of Mexico decreased, and Hurricane Katrina was degraded to a Category 3 hurricane 
(111-130mph). 
 
On 29
th
 August 2005 Hurricane Katrina, which was one of the strongest storms ever to hit the 
coast of the United States, brought intense winds, high rainfall, waves, and storm surges that 
caused widespread devastation in New Orleans and along the coasts of Louisiana, 
Mississippi, and Alabama. Levees and floodwalls were overtopped and several were 
breached, allowing billions of gallons of water from the Gulf of Mexico, Lake Borgne, and 
Lake Pontchartrain to flow into New Orleans, flooding major portions of the city.  
 
Consequences of Failure of Protection System 
The following statistics in relation to the Hurricane Katrina disaster identify the devastation 
that was caused: 
 Fatalities: As of 2ndAugust 2006,1,118 people confirmed dead 
 Damage to residential and non-residential property: $ 21 billion 
 Damage to public infrastructure: $ 6.7 billion   
 Population displaced: Approximately 50% 
 Regional economy: Approximately 124,000 jobs lost and the region’s economy 
crippled 
 
Technical Causes of Failure 
From the many causes identified in previous studies (ASCE, 2007; Select Bipartisan 
Committee, 2007;Jonkman et al, 2009; and Crowther et al, 2007) as being responsible for the 
disaster the high level ones can be categorised as either direct or contributory. 
Direct Causes: 
a) Levees breached: Authorities used I-walls to raise levee elevations instead of 
increasing width and height with earth, wrong elevation datums were used and they 
did not account for soft I-wall foundations resulting in overtopping and I-wall 
collapse. Also many infrastructure penetrations were made through levees. 
b) Ineffective pumping stations: Under-rated pumping stations which were not 
hurricane resistant required the presence of an operator and power to function, 
resulting in only 16% utilisation of the limited pumping capacity for the region.  
Contributing Factors 
c) Hurricane protection management policy: Poor risk management approach, 
uncoordinated construction, maintenance and operation of levees, and also no levee 
subsidence correction program all contributed to the unfolding of the disaster. 
d) Inadequate emergency response: Lack of a mandatory evacuation order, unprepared 
local and state emergency response agencies and a late national response impacted 
rescue efforts. 
 
4. METHODOLOGY OF THE HYBRID MODELLING APPROACH 
As mentioned in Section 1, the innovative aspect of this paper is the integration of modelling 
approaches in a generic hybrid model. In order to show how the different tools and 
techniques of the hybrid model are co-ordinated, both Figure 1 and Table I show how the 
integration of the methods is developed and describes the tools used in terms of their input 
requirements, expected outputs and sources of information. It also shows how each tool 
relates to another.  The AHP methodology was used as a prioritisation method rather than the 
Analytic Network Process (ANP) although the later allows interaction between the different 
criteria, due to the fact that AHP is hierarchical in nature which corresponds to the 
architecture of FTA. Furthermore the simplicity in computation of AHP compared to ANP 
justifies its use especially in a situation where hybrid modelling is used. 
 
As stated before, single techniques have limited capacities to represent complex realities, so 
simply adding more techniques does not necessarily improve learning. It may make 
inferences harder to make, it may introduce contradictions, and it may impede efforts to 
assemble a systemic, rather than reductionist understanding. Also uncertainty can arise from 
limitations in different models which may be of three types (Rougier et al, 2010); parametric 
uncertainty in terms of not knowing the correct settings of the parameters, input uncertainty 
in terms of not knowing the value of the data, and structural uncertainty in terms of failure to 
represent the natural system. The emphasis in this paper is on the structure aspect of 
modelling, and uses the Katrina Disaster as an example to demonstrate the approach.
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Table I: Integration of tools with the proposed hybrid model. 
 
Tools and associated Figures and 
Tables that discuss results of the 
tool 
Data used by each tool Tool’s outputs 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA).  
Identifies causes of failure (failure 
modes) and interactions between 
causes 
Figures (2) and (4) 
 Data related to technical causes of the failures 
based on understanding of the problem and 
based on previously published research (e.g. 
ASCE, 2007) 
 Information on failure modes and their root causes in 
the form of basic events, for input into FMECA tool. 
 Information on interdependence in the form of OR and 
AND gates, for input into RBD tool. 
  Hierarchical model, for input into AHP tool. 
Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) 
Provides better understanding of the 
reliability of the system 
Figure (3) 
 Basic events from the FTA tool. 
 Relationship between basic events from FTA 
i.e. every OR gate in FTA is mapped as a 
‘series’ structure in RBD, and every AND 
gate in FTA is a ‘parallel’ structure in RBD.  
 
 Information in terms of ‘series’ and ‘parallel’ 
structures to inform about the relative weights 
assigned in the AHP tool.  
 Demonstrates how the overall system reliability can be 
calculated and improved by strengthening weak 
(series) structures in the diagram. 
Failure Mode Effect and Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA) 
Analyses probability of failure modes 
against severity of consequences and 
difficulty of detection 
Tables (II - V) 
 Failure modes from the FTA tool.  Risk Priority Number (RPN)  
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) 
Provides prioritisation of alternative 
decisions and sensitivity analysis for a 
decision maker. 
Figures (5), (6) and (7) 
 Risk priority number (RPN) from FMECA 
tool. 
 The hierarchical model from the FTA tool. 
 Series and parallel structures from the RBD 
tool. 
 Judgments from questionnaire completed by 
decision makers and informed by structure of 
FTA and RBD tools. 
 Prioritisation for Selection or Resource Allocation. 
 Sensitivity analysis - ‘What if’ analysis. 
 A measure of consistency  
 Feedback measure to the decision maker.  
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5. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS (FTA) 
A fault tree is a logical diagram which shows the interactions of failure events which lead to 
system failure, i.e. a specific undesirable event in the system, as well as failures of the 
components of the system. It is considered as a deductive logic model in which a system 
failure is postulated and reverse paths are developed to link the system failure with all 
subsystems that can contribute to that failure (Vesely et al, 1981) and (Ekaette et al, 2007). 
The undesirable event constitutes the 'TOP' event of the tree and the different component 
failures constitute the basic events of the tree. The causes of the TOP event are “connected” 
through logic gates; we only consider AND-gates and OR-gates. Basic events are those 
associated with human errors, equipment failure and environment interference. FTA provides 
a logical representation of the relation between the top event and those basic events. In order 
to explain how the component failures of the direct causes and contributing factors interact 
with each other, an FTA was constructed by the authors (Figure 2)  guided by the technical 
causes of the failures and our understanding of the problem based on previously published  
information as identified in Section 3 above. 
 
In order to build a mental model of possible causal factors, it is useful to start by categorising 
such factors into two or more broad classifications.  In process industry, and especially in 
nuclear energy, one can attribute failure to one of two main reasons; either a design integrity 
failure or an operational and maintenance failure.  For example in the case of Fukushima 
nuclear disaster, failure was clearly caused by the former rather than the latter, whereas in the 
case of Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the failure was attributed to a combination of both 
categories at varying degrees (Labib, and Read, 2013). In a natural disaster such as Hurricane 
Katrina, it is proposed to categorise possible causal factors into direct causes (such as levees 
breeched and ineffective pumping stations), and contributing factors (existing hurricane 
protection and management policy or inadequate emergency response). 
 
Starting at the top event or system failure (the Hurricane Katrina Disaster), the fault tree was 
built downwards from the undesired event to intermediate events (rectangular boxes) and 
then to basic events using logical AND/OR gates and deductive logic, i.e. repeatedly asking 
‘what are the reasons for this event?’ The basic events of the fault tree in this case refer to the 
component failures and human errors in the circular/elliptical shapes at the bottom of the 
diagram.   
 
The AND/OR gates describe the fault logic between the events, i.e. the logic gate underneath 
the intermediate event ‘Levees breached’ is an ‘OR’ gate. The inputs to this gate are ‘I-wall 
collapse’, ‘Overtopping’ and ‘Infrastructure breaches’. As these events are connected using 
OR logic this means that if any of these intermediate events occur, then they will cause the 
output event to occur i.e. ‘Levees breached’. If the type of gate used was instead an AND 
gate, then this would indicate a level of redundancy in the system in that all three basic 
events/component failures would have to occur before the output event would occur. For both 
AND gates and OR gates, the minimum number of inputs required to make these gates valid 
is two.  
 
A fault tree analysis can be used to define the undesired event to study, and obtain an 
understanding of the system. It can also provide a useful graphical representation of a 
hierarchical analysis of failure modes, as it provides a mental map that can help to understand 
the logic of the failure concerned. 
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Figure (2) Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) of the Hurricane Katrina Disaster 
 
Therefore, from the FTA we can obtain information on the degree of interdependence in the 
form of OR and AND gates, which are translated in series and parallel structures respectively 
and are described further in Section 6 through the RBD model. Also, from the FTA we can 
extract the different failure modes and their root causes in the form of basic events (the 
bottom circles in the FTA in Figure 2) and subsequently analyse their criticality as will be 
shown later in Section 7 using the FMECA model. Finally, as a mental model, it provides 
valuable information to structure the hierarchical AHP model for multiple criteria 
prioritisation in Section 8. 
 
6. RELIABILITY BLOCK DIAGRAM (RBD) 
A Reliability Block Diagram (RBD) is constructed to assess and improve the overall system 
reliability, as shown in Figure (3). 
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Figure (3) RBD (Reliability Block Diagram) of the Hurricane Katrina Disaster 
 
The Reliability Block Diagram gives additional value to the analysis, as it provides the 
decision maker with a better understanding of the overall reliability of the model by 
highlighting vulnerable aspects of the model, where series structures exist, and relatively safe 
areas where there is either redundancy or parallel structures. Moreover, given reliability 
values of different boxes (components), one can calculate the whole system’s reliability. So, 
in order to maximise system reliability and minimise system failure rate, then the number of 
series dependencies (components in series) should be kept to a minimum. 
 
An RBD can usually be constructed on the basis of information provided within an FS 
(Functional Specification) document, Schematic Drawing or a Piping and Instrumentation 
Drawing.  RBD’s can be constructed using a two-state assumption, i.e. either fully 
operational (up) or totally failed (down), which renders subsequent analysis much easier than 
it otherwise would be if a third state existed, i.e. partially failed (e.g. reduced output from 
pumping station).  Also this two-state assumption, which is conservative, makes reliability 
evaluations desirably cautious when safety assessments are involved 
 
Reliability Block Diagrams can be used to symbolise the way in which the system functions 
as required and is determined by the reliability dependencies. It can also be used to perform 
quantitative analysis. In our case we also use it for understanding that the ‘Direct Causes’ are 
modelled in a relatively safer parallel structure when compared to the ‘Contributing Factors’ 
which are modelled in series structure which is more vulnerable (Aven, 2011). Such 
information will be used in assessing the priorities using the AHP model in Section 8. 
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7. FAILURE MODES, EFFECTS AND CRITICALITY ANALYSIS 
Taking the direct causes only for the Hurricane Katrina disaster, it is possible using a basic 
FMECA (Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis) template, as shown in Table V, to 
document for each component mode of failure its effects (symptoms), cause of failure and 
how the failure can be eliminated or reduced.  
 
For example, the Levee: I-wall Collapse component mode of failure in the FMECA template 
(Table V, item nr 1) would be populated as follows: 
 Component and Mode of failure= Levee: I-wall collapse. 
 Effect i.e. symptoms = Immediate flooding of protected areas. 
 Cause of failure = Low safety margin used based on meteorological conditions for 
area, i.e. maximum category 3 barometric pressure and wind speed assumed (inherent 
effects of reduction from category 4/ 5 to 3 not factored in). 
 How can the failure be eliminated or reduced = 1. Strengthen/replace I-walls and 2. 
Segregate areas by use of internal levees to contain breaches. 
 
Next, by constructing word models for probability of occurrence, severity and difficulty of 
detection (Table II to IV) and applying these to the failure mode effect and criticality analysis 
(FMECA) template, it is possible to rank each component mode of failure in terms of each of 
these and to arrive at an overall Risk Priority Number (RPN) which can then be used to focus 
attention on the highest risk items. The information in Table (V) and its associated numerical 
probabilities were produced based on the authors’ understanding from the related literature 
published about the Hurricane Katrina disaster as outlined above, using the word models in 
Tables II to IV.RPN numbers have no units and the objective of FMECA is to reduce the 
RPN, which can be calculated as follows: 
 
 RPN = Probability of occurrence of failure (O) x Severity (S) x Difficulty of 
Detection (D) 
 Remaining with line item nr 1 example, the rankings would be populated and RPN 
calculated as follows: 
 Probability of occurrence of failure (O) = 3 i.e. Possible in time interval 10 – 20 
years 
 Severity (S) = 5 i.e. Loss of life, major property and economy damage 
 Difficulty of detection (D) = 3 i.e. Moderate 
 RPN = 3 x 5 x 3 = 45 
 
A  FMECA can be used to achieve the following:  
 It is a straight forward step-by-step technique almost universally accepted as a method 
for systematically determining the ways in which failure can occur and also the 
effects (from minor to catastrophic) that each such failure can have on overall 
functionality 
 The objective of FMECA is to anticipate failures and prevent them from occurring 
 A good FMECA will: identify known and potential failure modes, identify cause and 
effect of each failure mode and provide for problem follow-up and corrective action, 
and prioritises the identified failure modes according to the RPN 
 
13 
 
Bradley and Guerrero (2011) have acknowledged the wide use of FMECA in both product 
design and industry. However, they have identified two prominent criticisms of its traditional 
application viz. that according to measurement theory RPN is not a valid measure for ranking 
failure modes, and that it does not weight the three decision criteria used in FMECA. They 
have proposed a new ranking method that can overcome this criticism. Here, however, we 
use traditional FMECA and then use AHP to deal with the ranking issues.  
 
Table (II) RPN Word Model for FMECA of Direct Causes of Hurricane Katrina in 
terms of Probability of occurrence of failure (O) 
Keyword Time interval Score 
Very unlikely >50 years 1 
Unlikely 20 – 50 years 2 
Possible 10 – 20 years 3 
Probable 5 – 10 years 4 
Frequent <5 years 5 
 
Table (III) RPN Word Model for FMECA of Direct Causes of Hurricane Katrina in terms of 
Severity (S) 
Keyword Score 
Repair cost only 1 
Minor property damage 2 
Significant property and minor economy damage 3 
Major property and significant economy damage 4 
Loss of life, major property and economy damage 5 
 
Table (IV) RPN Word Model for FMECA of Direct Causes of Hurricane Katrina in terms of 
Difficulty of detection (D) 
Keyword Score 
Almost certain 1 
High 2 
Moderate 3 
Low 4 
Absolute uncertainty 5 
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Table (V) FMECA of Direct Causes of Hurricane Katrina 
Item 
Nr. 
Component and Mode of 
failure 
Effect i.e. symptoms Cause of failure O S D RPN How can the failure be eliminated or 
reduced? 
1 Levee: I-wall collapse Immediate flooding of protected 
areas 
Low safety margin used based on 
meteorological conditions for area i.e. 
maximum category 3 barometric pressure 
and wind speed assumed (inherent effects of 
reduction from category 4/5 to 3 not factored 
in) 
3 5 3 45 1. Strengthen/ replace I-walls 
2. Segregate areas by use of internal levees to 
contain breaches 
2 Levee: Overtopping Initial slow flooding of 
protected areas, followed by fast 
flooding on erosion and 
destruction of foundations 
Soft soils beneath and adjacent to levees 
unprotected 
3 4 4 48 1. Harden soils beneath/ adjacent to levees by 
mixing in/ replacing with aggregate 
2. Protect soils adjacent to levees with 
concrete 
3 Levee: Overtopping Fast flooding of protected areas Incorrect design elevations (1 to 2 feet) due 
to use of wrong datum 
3 5 2 30 Raise levees to correct elevation 
4 Levee: Infrastructure Breaches Initial slow flooding of 
protected areas, followed by fast 
flooding on further erosion of 
breach 
Many penetrations through levees for roads, 
railroads and utilities 
4 4 2 32 Eliminate/ redesign levee penetrations 
5 Pumping Stations: Underrated 
capacity 
Floodwaters in protected areas 
continue to rise 
Underrated i.e. only suitable for storm water 
runoff and routine seepage water from 
interior drainage system 
3 4 4 48  Increase pumping capacity to cope with storm 
surges from surrounding bodies of water 
6 Pumping Stations: Location Floodwaters remain in protected 
areas 
Stations not located in areas worst hit by 
floods 
3 4 3 36 Build pumping stations in areas likely to flood 
7 Pumping Stations: Piping 
design 
Floodwater recirculation back to 
body of water where it came 
from 
Discharges hard piped back into canals and 
waterways 
4 4 2 32 Re-route discharges away from city and 
bodies of water so that recirculation cannot 
occur 
8 Pumping Stations: Backflow Water back flowed to city 
through inoperable pumps/ 
discharge pipes 
No automatic backflow preventers in place 3 4 2 24 Install automatic backflow preventers 
9 Pumping Stations: Building 
design 
Pumping stations became 
inoperable  
Not designed to withstand hurricane forces 
and hence damaged by hurricane 
3 3 4 36 Reinforce/ rebuild so as to withstand hurricane 
forces  
10 Pumping Stations: Operation Pumping stations became 
inoperable  
Dependant on operators who were evacuated 
and no automatic control 
3 3 3 27 Automate pumping stations so that they can 
operate without operators present 
11 Pumping Stations: Power Pumping stations became 
inoperable  
Dependant on electricity which was knocked 
out early on and no backup generation 
4 3 2 24 Install redundancy in power supply lines and 
onsite backup generation 
(O) - Probability of occurrence of failure, (S) - Severity, (D) - Difficulty of detection, (RPN) - Risk Number
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The item numbers in Table (V) of the FMECA correspond to the items in the FTA in Figure 
(2) as shown below in Figure (4) below. 
 
 
Figure (4) Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) of the Hurricane Katrina Disaster with item 
numbers shown from Table (V) 
 
8. ANALYTIC HIERACHY PROCESS MODELLING 
The Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is a multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) method. 
The objective of AHP is to act as a mental model and for prioritisation. Mental models such 
as AHP, and FTA, help the decision makers to understand the environment (Porac and 
Thomas, 1990). Prioritisation is then useful for either a selection decision – choose the 
highest priority alternative, or as a portfolio resource allocation decision – allocate resources 
according to the percentage of weights allocated to different alternatives. The AHP helps the 
decision-maker facing a complex problem with multiple conflicting and subjective criteria. 
For a review reporting the applications of AHP, please consult Forman and Gass (2001), 
whereas for a review of methodological developments of AHP the reader can consult 
Ishizaka and Labib (2011). This approach has been originated by Saaty (1997, 1980, and 
1994) and requires the decision maker(s) to provide judgements about the relative importance 
of each criterion and then specify a preference on each criterion for each decision alternative.  
 
The FTA model shown in Figure (2) is used as the hierarchical model in AHP, where the 
higher levels are criteria and sub-criteria, and the basic events (root causes) are considered as 
the alternatives. This paper then translates the diagram shown in Figure (2) into an AHP 
hierarchy as shown in Figure (5), where the second and third levels are criteria and sub-
criteria, and the third level identifies the different alternatives (basic events). 
 
1 2,3 
4 
5 6,7,8,9 10,11 
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Figure (5): A Hierarchical Model Based on AHP 
 
Using the software package Expert Choice, pair-wise comparison is then performed on each 
level with respect to the level above. The pair-wise judgement is informed by the FTA model 
in Figure (2). For example, when comparing ‘Direct Causes’ to ‘Contributing Factors’  more 
relative weight is given to ‘Contributing Factors’ than to ‘Direct Causes’. The rationale 
behind this is the interdependence of the events below those two factors. Under ‘Direct 
Causes’ there is an AND gate, which implies that there are two factors that have 
simultaneously affected the direct causes namely; ‘Levees Breached’ AND ‘Ineffective 
Pumping Stations’ and this implies an element of redundancy. Whereas under  ‘Contributing 
Factors’ there is an OR gate, which implies that either ‘Hurricane Protection Management 
Policy’ OR ‘Inadequate Emergency Response’ can have a direct effect on the ‘Contributing 
Factors’. This is also clearly demonstrated in the RBD model in Figure (3) where the ‘Direct 
Causes’ are modelled in a relatively safer parallel structure as compared to the ‘Contributing 
Factors’ which are modelled in series structure which is more vulnerable (Aven, 2011). 
 
The pair-wise judgement is also informed by the FMECA model in Table (V). However 
FMECA is only applicable for failure modes and hence RPN values are only provided for 
items under ‘Direct Causes’. Items under ‘Contributing Factors’ are subjectively assessed. 
The risk priority number (RPN) in Table (V) provides useful information about the rankings 
of different risks (failure modes) associated with the Hurricane Katrina disaster. 
 
We know from the FTA in Figure (2) that  under ‘Levees Breached’, the three items of ‘I-
Wall Collapse’, ‘Levee Overtopping’, and ‘Infrastructure Breaches’ are the most relevant and 
hence take the highest weights of the value of 9 (extreme) compared to the rest of the items. 
We also know from the RPN values in Table (V) combined with information in Figure 4 
Goal: Hurricane Katrina Disaster 
Direct Causes 
Levees Breeched 
Contributing Factors 
Ineffective Pumping Station Hurricane Protection Mgmt Inadequate Emergency  
Alternative 1 
- i-Wall  
collapse 
Alternative 2 -  
Overtopping 
Alternative..n 
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(which contains FTA with failure mode numbers from Table V at the bottom left side of the 
figure) that ‘I-Wall Collapse’ (45 RPN value) is slightly higher than ‘Levee Overtopping’ 
(combined average of 39 i.e. half way between 30 and 48) which is in turn slightly higher 
than ‘Infrastructure Breaches’ (32 RPN value). This sort of logic for elicitation for the 
prioritisation of alternatives is shown in Figure (6).  
 
 
Figure (6): Priorities of Alternatives under ‘Levees Breached’ 
 
The same comparison is then carried out across the rest of the hierarchy. Once the pair-wise 
comparisons are completed, the calculations of the overall basic events (alternatives) ranking 
is obtained as shown in Figure (7). 
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Figure (7): Overall priorities of alternatives (basic events) 
 
There are three outputs that can be produced from the AHP model as shown below: 
 
1. An overall ranking as shown in Figure (7) where the summation of rankings is equal to 
unity. This helps in case one needs to allocate resources among alternative basic events. 
It also helps in understanding how each basic event is compared to the other.  
 
2. A measure of Overall Inconsistency of the decision maker’s preferences which is a 
useful feedback for validation of consistency, as explained before. Overall consistency 
less than 10% is normally acceptable as a measure of consistent preferences. Saaty 
(1980) has developed a random generated matrix for each matrix dimension which is 
called consistency index (CI). Essentially consistency is measured by providing a 
degree of closeness to a random generated matrix of judgments in the form of 
consistency ratio (CR). So the further away from randomness the more consistent we 
are. 
 
3. A facility to perform sensitivity analysis (what-if analysis) which provides information 
about the causal relationships among the different factors. This capability can help us to 
explain and predict the different relationships among criteria and alternatives. This 
aspect has not been demonstrated in the current work due to size limitation. 
 
It is worth noting here that pair-wise comparisons between failure mechanisms could have 
been done by comparing limit state functions of strength and loading variables, instead of 
subjective scoring on a scale of 1 to 9. However, it is argued that the ability to handle 
subjectivity is the strength of the AHP method. Moreover AHP offers both sensitivity 
analysis and feedback on consistency. This sensitivity analysis can help to predict the 
importance of criteria in changing environments that will subsequently affect the importance 
of different alternatives. 
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9. DISCUSSION AND LESSONS LEARNED 
 
It has been argued by some critics that such an analysis cannot be realistically calculated and 
that results are irrelevant when there is a high degree of subjectivity. It should be emphasised 
here that in this paper the incorporation of FTA and RBD methods are intended for a risk-
informed rather than a risk-based decision making as outlined by Apostolakis (2004). Hence 
the approach proposed here is intended to address the nature of the risk rather than attempting 
to quantify the risk per se. 
 
Apostolakis (2004) provides a balanced approach with respect to benefits and limitations of 
such techniques and argues that these tools are not perfect but represents a considerable 
advancement in rational decision making.  Our approach is in line with the three questions 
posed by Kaplan and Garrick (1981): 1) what can go wrong? 2) How likely is this?  And 3) 
what are the consequences? So our approach in using reliability analysis is stronger on 
relativities (i.e. relative comparisons and trends) but weak on absolutes. Nevertheless it is 
believed that a candle in the dark is better than no light at all. 
 
Using the overall hierarchical structure of Figures 2, 4 and 5 it is possible to see that broadly 
speaking there are strategic measures that need to be undertaken with the focus on addressing 
both the direct causes, in terms of design of levees and pumping stations, and the contributing 
factors, in terms of hurricane protection management policy and a more adequate emergency 
response. 
 
From the main recommendations of the published investigation reports cited at the beginning 
of Section 3 in this paper, the following operational and high level design 
improvements/lessons learned are identified for action, so as to eliminate or reduce the 
possibility of failure of the hurricane protection system in the future: 
 
1. Assign single entity responsibility for managing critical hurricane and flood 
protection systems, ensuring: 
i. The entity is organised and operated to enable, not inhibit, a focus on public 
safety, health and welfare. 
ii. Public safety, health and welfare are the top priorities. 
2. Establish a mechanism for a nationwide levee safety program, similar to that in place 
for dams. 
3. Quantify and periodically update the assessment of risk. 
4. Determine the level of acceptable risk in communities through quality interactive 
public risk communication programs, and manage risk accordingly. 
5. Establish continuous engineering evaluation of design criteria appropriateness, always 
considering the impact of individual components on the overall system. 
6. Correct hurricane and flood protection system physical deficiencies by establishing 
mechanisms to incorporate changing information. 
7. Implement more effective mechanisms to ensure co-ordination and co-operation 
between designers, maintainers and operators, e.g. apply concurrent engineering 
techniques. 
8. Engage independent experts in high level review of hurricane and flood protection 
systems. 
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At a more detailed level, the global priorities of alternatives shown in Figure (7) identifies the 
top six causal factors, which are: Poor Risk Management (PRM), Uncoordinated 
Construction, Maintenance and Operation (UCM&O), No Subsidence Correction (NSC), No 
Timely Mandatory Evacuation (NTME), Unprepared Local and State Agencies 
(UL&SA),and Late National Response (LNR). 
 
Using the notion of the House of Quality (Vanegas and Labib, 2001) where the ‘Whats’ are 
correlated to the ‘Hows’, Table VI shows the relationship between most important alternative 
causal factors as identified above (the ‘Whats’) and the suggested actions from the main 
recommendations of the published investigation reports (the ‘Hows’). 
 
Table VI: The relationship between the ‘Whats’ and ‘Hows’ using the House of Quality 
notation. 
 
  Columns represent ‘Hows’, i.e. suggested actions 
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M: Medium impact, H: High impact 
 
10. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The main contribution of this analysis of the causes of the Katrina disaster is that it shows 
that the proposed methodology can produce better information for policy makers. This is 
achieved through the utilisation of selective operational research and reliability analysis 
related techniques in an integrated approach. Such methodology supports modelling of the 
factors that lead to a disaster and then provides a facility for taking rational decisions. So this 
prompts the question: What is new in the proposed theory?  Is it novel relationships?  Or is it 
better decisions?  It is probably both of these, but with emphasis on mental modelling, as it is 
believed that formulating a problem normally solves 80% of it. This is in line with the 
argument posed by Einstein and Infeld (1938) “The formulation of a problem is often more 
essential than its solution, which may be merely a matter of mathematical or experimental 
skill”.  It is acknowledged that every technique has its own limitation, and hence the 
originality of the approach lies in utilising a hybrid of techniques that tend to cancel the 
limitations inherent in any one of the used techniques when used on its own.   
The novelty of this work is three-fold; firstly through the demonstration of the 
interactive and integrative nature of the chosen hybrid tools. Secondly, such integration 
is presented in a novel way where each tool is first explained in the form of related 
figures and tables, then categories of different types of data used by each tool is 
outlined, followed by identification of the specific outputs from each tool. Finally, the 
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relationship between most important alternative causal factors for the disaster are 
mapped against suggested decisions for resource allocation utilising the concept of the 
house of quality notation to map the ‘whats’ against the ‘hows’. 
 
This work has indicated how some current ranking and sensitivity analysis methods 
might be applied to the example of the Katrina disaster.  It is believed that such an 
approach can significantly improve the objectivity of risk management decision making.  
 
In terms of reliability analysis, FTA has been employed to show how some of the direct 
causes and contributing factors of the disaster interacted with each other. It provided 
information on the failure modes that have been used in the FMECA model. Also, it provided 
information on interdependence, in the form of OR and AND gates, which was useful for the 
RBD model, and finally it provided a hierarchical structure which improved our 
understanding of the problem, and which formed the basis for the developed AHP model. 
RBD representation has then been used to demonstrate how overall system reliability can be 
calculated and improved. RBD provided information, in terms of series and parallel 
structures, which has been used to inform our elicitation of judgements in the AHP model. 
The FMECA model has then been used to determine Risk Priority Number which has been 
used to rank the risk of different failure modes. Subsequently, this has informed our 
judgements in the pair-wise comparison within the AHP model. 
In terms of MCDM, we have utilised an AHP analysis which was able to provide 
prioritisation, sensitivity analysis and feedback on consistency of the different criteria and 
alternative contributing factors. Finally, some of the high level design improvements/lessons 
learned, which should be acted upon so as to avoid a repeat disaster, have been discussed.  
A generic approach has been offered that can be used for risk and safety analysis in order to 
learning from disasters. This approach can also be applied to previous research studies of 
process and nuclear disasters such as those of Pate-Cornell (1993), and Vaurio (1984). 
 
It can be argued that the Fault Tree in Figure 2 is a more general logic tree rather than a strict 
classical Fault Tree as traditionally used to analyse failures at equipment level. The reason is 
that the “Hurricane Katrina Disaster” is depicted as a top event (which is not strictly 
traditional in the usual fault tree sense, i.e. is not a well-defined subset of a sample space, to 
which a binary indicator variable can be attached – 1 for occurrence, 0 for non-occurrence). 
The advantage of using the proposed approach is that it offers richness to the model, so that 
both subjective judgement and objective evaluation measures are taken into account in a 
mental model.  
 
More empirical research is needed on how (or whether) ranking and sensitivity analysis, 
as proposed in this paper, will improve risk management decisions more than other 
approaches. Also more research is needed in the field of expert and intelligent systems 
in terms of investigation of the degree of compatibility of tools when considering hybrid 
modelling approaches.  Another related area of future research is the assessment of 
interdependencies among failure modes and the impact of simultaneous hazards.  
Modelling of combination of hazards is now an area that is attracting much research in 
the wake of Fukushima nuclear power disaster in Japan (Labib 2015) and the interest 
in such phenomena is expected to grow. Also future research is needed in the fields of 
coping with beyond design scenarios (Labib, and Harris 2015), and the impact of 
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human factors in dealing with disasters. An interesting variation to this theme can 
relate to research into the impact of cultures on perception of risk and response to 
disasters as highlighted by Kulatunga et al (2006), and Kulatunga (2010). Capacity 
building for post-disaster infrastructure as highlighted by Haigh and Amaratunga 
(2009) is an area that needs more empirical research. Finally, the impact of resource 
shortage and su[ply disruptions during pot-disaster reconstruction as highlighted by 
Chang et al (2010) is an area that also needs more empirical research. 
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